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INTRODUCTION

Donald Perkl is a person with intellectual disabilities and autism spectrum disorder.' After successfully working in a sheltered workshop for
more than six years, he was hired as a janitor at a local Chuck E. Cheese.
On Perkl's first day on the job, regional manager Donald Creasy visited the
restaurant. Seeing Perkl, Creasy instructed store manager Brea Wittwer to
fire Perkl on the ground that it was Chuck E. Cheese's policy not to hire
"those kind of people.m Creasy made a similarly dismissive statement regarding Perkl's predecessor, another individual with developmental disabilities.3 Wittwer attempted to resist Creasy's order by requesting
additional time to sort out Perkl's position. She also faxed a plaintive note
to the human resources department indicating that, although Perkl was
Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
•• Professor, William & Mary School of Law; Executive Director, Harvard Project on Disability.
We thank Susan Stefan and Penelope Stein for deep reflections on earlier drafts; Kelly Brown for research assistance; and Julie Waterstone for support. Michael Stein's work was supported in part by a
grant from the Foundation Open Society Institute (Zug).
1
See EEOC v. CEC Entm't, No. 98-C-698-X, 2000 WL 1339288, at *2 (W.O. Wis. Mar. 14, 2000);
see also Peter Blanck, First Thornburgh Family Lecture on Disability Law and Policy, Americans with
Disabilities and Their Civil Rights: Past, Present, and Future, 66 U. Pin. L. REV. 687, 695 (2005)
[hereinafter Blanck, First Thornburgh] (Professor Blanck testified as an expert witness on Mr. Perkl's
behalf); Peter Blanck, Justice for All? Stories About Americans with Disabilities and Their Civil Rights,
8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. I (2004).
2
CEC Entm 't, 2000 WL 1339288, at *3.
3 /d.
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qualified and his accommodations externally paid for, Creasy was intent on
firing Perkl because of his disabilities. 4
Perkl continued to work at the restaurant for several more weeks, earning excellent work evaluations and the esteem and friendship of his coworkers. However, upon a later visit to Chuck E. Cheese, Creasy
terminated Perkl's employment after Wittwer refused to do so. 5 Wittwer
and her entire staff resigned in protest and testified on Perkl's behalf in a
subsequent lawsuit. 6 Perkl prevailed at trial, and the jury awarded him legal
fees, seventy thousand dollars in compensatory damages and thirteen million dollars in punitive damages. 7 The trial court later reduced the punitive
damages award to the statutory maximum. 8 Notably, the defendant contended that Perkl's intellectual disability rendered him incapable of experiencing emotional distress from the abrupt firing. 9
The narrative of Donald Perkl's employment discrimination experience
involves two tightly linked threads. First is the overt bigotry animating
Creasy's statement that Perkl was inherently inferior and undeserving of
equal treatment. This form of prejudice drives Mark C. Weber's powerful
book, Disability Harassment. 10 Second is the equally harmful preconception that influenced Chuck E. Cheese's contention that people with cognitive disabilities cannot feel emotional anguish, 11 and by implication, that the
legal and social standing of people with disabilities is not the same as that
of other citizens.
This second theme of unconscious prejudice animates the field of antidiscrimination law but is an area less explored in Weber's latest book. We
therefore address invidious, unconscious discrimination in this Review Essay by making the case for why people with psycho-social (also called mental) disabilities, 12 who are largely cqnsidered to be among the most
4

/d. ("Can someone please help me with this situation, so we can at least give this guy a chance?
We are an equal opportunity employer, are we not?").
5
/d. at *4.
6
See Blanck, First Thornburgh, supra note I, at 695.
7
See id. at 696 ("[Perkl'sjury verdict was] the largest monetary award from a jury in an [Americans
with Disabilities Act] employment case brought by the EEOC.").
8
CEC Entm "t, 2000 WL 1339288, at *I ("[T]he total award is statutorily capped at $300,000.").
9
See Leye Jeannette Chrzanowski, Jury Finds Hiring and Firing Based on Ability Not Myths, Fears
and Stereotypes, GREAT LAKES ADA NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 31, 2000, http://www.uic.edu/orgs/adagreatlakes/adanews/00 ljuryfinds.htm.
10
MARK C. WEBER, DISABILITY HARASSMENT (2007).
11
On the contrary, Perkl's foster mother testified that he "was very excited and happy when he got
the job," proudly showed off his new uniform "and jumped up and down so high that his head hit the
ceiling." By contrast, "Perkl came home early on the day he was terminated and went immediately to
his room without communicating with anyone;" subsequently, "Perkl has been less attentive to his personal hygiene, fails to get up on his own in the morning, has less interest in participating in social activities or family activities and lost II pounds." CEC Entm 't, 2000 WL 1339288, at *5.
12
The nomenclature involving people with disabilities can be confusing as well as problematic.
"Disability," "disabilities," and "disabled," when coupled with prefixes referring to people or persons,
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stigmatized individuals, should and can be integrated into the workplace. In
doing so, our assertions go beyond legal protections to argue that occupationally integrating individuals with mental disabilities is also beneficial for
their coworkers without disabilities.
Part I of this Review Essay sets forth Weber's thesis, arguments, and
conclusions regarding disability-based harassment. Part II briefly overviews the influence of deeply embedded unconscious discrimination, especially as it affects occupational participation by minority groups, including
people with disabilities. Next, Part III provides an initial treatment of why
people with mental disabilities normatively should and practically can be
incorporated into the workforce. In doing so, we highlight some of the less
currently appreciated benefits of integrating these workers. We conclude
with a few thoughts on how incorporating individuals with psycho-social
disabilities may be seen as part of the overall dynamic of increasing flexibility in the evolving workplace, including some advantages that redound to
their nondisabled peers.
I.

DISABILITY HARASSMENT

Mark Weber accomplishes three significant tasks in Disability Harassment: he demonstrates the existence of disability harassment, explains
the harm that it causes, and provides courts with tools to prevent future instances of disability-based maltreatment. Disability Harassment thereby
contributes to the antidiscrimination literature by focusing attention on the
comparatively less examined, but pervasive phenomenon of intentional mistreatment of people with disabilities. 13 In doing so, Weber deftly weaves his
three central points through an account that is at turns both doctrinal and
normative. Doctrinally, Disability Harassment addresses the application of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 14 in the workplace, and the application of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEAY 5 in
schools. Weber's normative assertions regarding disability-based harassment are consistent across these fields. Yet, because less effort has gone

have become terms of art and are utilized worldwide in statutory language and in policy schemes, although some disability rights advocates are adverse to them. How one draws a line between physical
and mental disabilities, however, is open to interpretation. For the purposes of this Review Essay, psycho-social disabilities and mental disabilities are intended to embrace persons with psychiatric conditions (e.g., schizophrenia and bipolar disorder) as well as neuro-atypical conditions (such as the autism
spectrum), but not intellectual disabilities (like Down Syndrome). We note that members of the latter
group also number among the most excluded and socially stigmatized, and are therefore addressed separately in other scholarship by the authors.
13
See also Mark C. Weber, Disability Harassment in the Public Schools, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv.
1079 (2002); Mark C. Weber, Exile and the Kingdom: Integration, Harassment, and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 63 MD. L. REv. 162 (2004).
14
42 u.s.c. § 12,101 (2000).
15
20 u.s.c. § 1400 (2000).
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into integrating Americans with disabilities in the workplace than in
schools, this Review Essay focuses on workplace practices. 16
Disability Harassment opens with powerful narratives that poignantly
show the face of disability harassment. Sandra Spragis Flowers was ostracized when her employers discovered she had HIV. Her employers and fellow employees stopped going to lunch with Sandra, refused to shake her
hand, subjected her to constant drug tests and eventually fired her. 17 Ricky
Casper's supervisors subjected him to a barrage of abuse centered on his
learning disability. He was called a "tax write-off," told his children would
be mentally impaired, subjected to profanity, required to repeat satisfactorily completed work, and threatened by one supervisor that he would have
sex with Casper's fiance so she could see "what good sex was." 18
Having initiated the reader to the sort of discrimination Disability Harassment seeks to combat, Weber turns to the applicable legal doctrine.
Courts have held that the ADA furnishes a cause of action for workplace
harassment 19 through Title I's prohibition of discrimination in the "terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment."20 Specifically, these courts have
noted that the ADA's statutory language is identical to the antidiscrimination prohibitions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 21 Because the
latter's terms routinely are interpreted to cover race- and sex-based harassment claims, 22 courts have reasoned that harassment actions likewise extend
to the realm of disability-based discrimination. 23
Disability Harassment argues that the statutory analogy between Title
VII and Title I harassment claims is understandable but nonetheless is ultimately inappropriate. 24 This is because a second statutory analogy drawn
from Title VII harassment case law requires plaintiffs to show the harsh and
invidious nature of the harassing conditions. 25 Within the disability field,
16

See also Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Disparate Impact, and Class
Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861 (2006).
17
WEBER, supra note 10, at 1-2.
18
!d. at I.
19
!d. at 30 ("In fact, courts have uniformly concluded that the ADA furnishes a cause of action to
remedy a work environment that is hostile to persons with disabilities."); see also, e.g., Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (allowing an employee with a back injury to bring a suit
against his employer under Title I of the ADA for creating a hostile work environment).
20
42 U.S.C. § 12,112(a) (2000).
21
!d.§ 2000e-2(a)(l).
22
See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57 (1986).
23
WEBER, supra note 10, at 31 ("The ADA antidiscrimination provisions were drafted with language similar to the language in Title VII that had authoritatively been construed to include hostileenvironment causes of action."); see also, e.g., Fox, 247 F.3d at 175-76 (finding a right of action under
the ADA because it uses language drawn from Title VII).
24
WEBER, supra note 10, at 31-35.
25
See Ha"is, 510 U.S. at 21 ("Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment ... is beyond Title VII's purview.").
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this manifests in a parallel proof requirement that the workplace is "permeated with discriminatory conduct-intimidation, ridicule, insult-that is
sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment."26
In Weber's view, this condition has precluded many disability-based
harassment claims because judges have not appreciated the severity of disability harassment, even in those cases with shocking fact pattems. 27 To
document this claim, the book sets forth cases where supervisors harassed
employees in front of other coworkers by habitually referring to them as
"lazy," "crippled," or worthless; managers condoned coworkers "routinely"
ridiculing and jeering the oral communication of an employee with a severe
speech disorder; and an employee with a mild developmental disability was
derided and called "Rick Retardo"; as well as other harassing incidents. 28
Yet none of these deplorable episodes was considered severe or pervasive
enough to impair working conditions. 29
Disability Harassment avers that the ADA contains a more specific
provision regarding harassment than the broad interpretation drawn from
Title VII's general antidiscrimination prohibition. 30 Specifically, the ADA
makes it "unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of' any protected right. 31 The provision exists in addition to a separate, earlier one making retaliation
unlawful. 32 The discrete harassment section, § 12,203(b), likewise super26

Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788,804 (7th Cir. 1999).
WEBER, supra note 10, at 33-35. Other commentators also challenge the propriety of the severe
or pervasive standard for disability cases. See, e.g., Lisa Eichorn, Hostile Environment Actions, Title
VII, and the ADA: The Limits of the Copy-and-Paste Function, 77 WASH. L. REv. 575 (2002) (arguing
that people with disabilities have faced greater seclusion and isolation than women and minorities, and
hence that the ADA ought to be given leeway from Title VII standards). We argue elsewhere that
judges comprehend disability-based discrimination as being different from discrimination on the ground
of race or sex. See Stein & Waterstone, supra note 16, at 886 ("[N]either judges nor scholars have felt
comfortable replacing 'black or female workers' with 'disabled workers."'); Michael Ashley Stein, Same
Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579
(2004) (describing a canonical view of disability discrimination that distinguishes it from "real" civil
rights claims).
28
WEBER, supra note 10, at 33-34.
29
/d. The book also recounts one case in which a veteran with post-traumatic stress disorder was
harassed by coworkers who made loud explosive noises and laughed as he hid under furniture. The
court dismissed the case before trial on the ground that the plaintiff's "mental condition did not establish
him as a person with a disability." /d. at 32. Yet, as Weber explains, the coworkers clearly regarded the
victim as disabled-~me of the ADA's definitions of disability-and so the court should have gone forward with the claim. /d.
30
/d. at 43. This assertion is all the more plausible when one considers that much advocacy was required to bring about judicial recognition of race and sex-based harassment as causes of action, whereas
the notion of harassment was already well instantiated by the time of the ADA's passage. See generally
Catherine MacKinnon, The Logic of Experience: Reflections on the Development of Sexual Harassment
Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 813 (2002).
31
42
§ 12,203(b) (2000).
32
/d. § 12,203(a) ("No person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has
opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge,
27

u.s.c.
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sedes the retaliation proscription because disability-based harassment interferes with an employee's ability to show up to work on the same terms as
her peers. 33 It is this "right of being there" that, in Weber's estimation, is
the most important legal protection established by the ADA. 34 Indeed, he
grounds this right in the ADA's preamble section, which acknowledges the
historic exclusion of people with disabilities from mainstream society and
mandates its eradication. 35 Thus, according to Disability Harassment, there
is no basis for grafting the "severe or pervasive" standard derived from Title
VII suits onto disability harassment claims. 36
Weber also notes other intriguing possibilities for the ADA's antiharassment section. First, because§ 12,203(b) covers "any person" and not
"any person with a disability," it extends to individuals without disabilities
who are subject to prejudicial treatment. This includes individuals who
mistakenly are considered disabled, and nondisabled individuals who associate with disabled persons. 37 Second, the provision is not limited to an employer's vicarious liability, with the consequence that discriminatory
coworkers and supervisors can conceivably be sued as well. 38 Finally, because § 12,203(b) applies to the entire statute, disability-based harassment
claims might be brought under the ADA's other titles covering public services and public accommodations. 39
Apart from these doctrinal moves, the real power of Weber's analysis
comes from its normative underpinnings. Disability Harassment consistently locates its topic within the larger theoretical framework of the minorAccording to this view, the constructed
ity model of disability. 40
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
chapter.").
33
See WEBER, supra note I 0, at 43-46.
34
!d. at 46. For the origin of this notion, also called "participatory justice," see Jacobus tenBroek,
The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CAL. L. REV. 841 (1966). For a
discussion in contemporary context, see Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 CAL. L.
REV. 75,88-91 (2007).
35
42 U.S.C. § 12,10l(a)(2}-(5) (setting forth the legislative findings regarding the historical exclusion of people with disabilities from American society, including the workplace).
36
Courts have not imposed this standard on retaliation claims. See Mondzelewski v. Pathmark
Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Finnegan v. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 184
F. Supp. 2d 457 (D. Md. 2002); Crane v. Vision Quest Nat'!, No. Civ.A.98-4797, 2000 WL 1230465
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2000).
37
See 42 U.S.C. § 12,203(b); WEBER, supra note 10, at 55.
38
See 42 U.S.C. § 12,203(b); WEBER, supra note 10, at 55-56. Notably, courts have held that
§ 12,203(a), which contains similar language, includes liability for individual defendants. See, e.g.,
Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211 (lith Cir. 2004); Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344 F.3d 1161, 1168
(I I th Cir. 2003); Reg'! Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 45 n.l
(2d Cir. 2002).
39
See WEBER, supra note 10, at 56-57. See generally Michael E. Waterstone, The Untold Story of
the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1807 (2005) (discussing the relative
dearth of ADA Title II and III cases).
40
See WEBER, supra note 10, at 13-15.

1356

102:1351 (2008)

Disabling Prejudice

environment and the attitudes that it reflects play a central role in creating
what society labels as "disability."41 Thus, factors external to a person's
impairments determine how disabled from functioning in a given society
that individual will be. 42 The model thus suggests that the current exclusion
based on disability is a social construct, much like the now-outmoded conventions relating to race and sex. 43
In making a case for the social model of disability, Weber argues that
architectural and communication barriers isolate people with disabilities. 44
"If barriers prevent individuals from riding the bus, entering stores, restaurants, and government buildings, or making use of places of public entertainment," he reasons, "people with impairments will remain invisible,
hidden, and a source of fear and unpleasant associations."45 Disability Harassment uses the example of the Academy Award-winning film Million
Dollar Baby and "its apparent endorsement" of euthanizing an injured female boxer to demonstrate how society constructs a distorted view of disability, one in which life with a disability is not worth living. 46 Weber
argues that the movie, by displaying horrible and worsening conditions for

41

A blunt version of the social model is that of feminist disability rights advocate Susan Wendell,
who avers that "the entire physical and social organization of life" has been created with the able-bodied
in mind. SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON
DISABILITY 39 (1996). A more nuanced description is by philosopher and disability rights commentator
Anita Silvers, who argues that being biologically anomalous is only viewed as abnormal due to unjust social arrangements, most notably the existence of a hostile environment that is "artificial and remediable"
as opposed to "natural and immutable." Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE,
DISCRIMINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN 8IOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 13, 75 (Anita Silvers et
al. eds., 1998).
42
As explained by one of the originators of the theory:
[The social model] is based on three major postulates: (I) the primary problems faced by disabled
persons stem from social attitudes rather than from functional limitations; (2) all facets of the manmade environment are shaped or molded by public policy; and (3) in a democratic society, public
policies represent prevailing public attitudes and values.
Harlan Hahn, Feminist Perspectives, Disability, Sexuality, and Law: New Issues and Agendas, 4. S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN's STIJD. 97, 105 (1994).
43
For elaboration of this argument, see Stein, supra note 27, at 599 ("According to this framework,
the physical environment and the attitudes it reflects play a controlling (if not central) role in creating
what society terms 'disability.' Thus, factors exogenous to a person's own impairments determine how
much she can function in society.").
44
But see Adam M. Samaha, What Good is the Social Model of Disability?, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
1251 (2007) (claiming that the social model has "no policy implications" because it does not provide the
values upon which any policy judgment must rest).
45
WEBER, supra note 10, at 23-24.
46
!d. at 23. Weber also points out that the film was directed by Clint Eastwood, a notable opponent
of disability rights. !d. at 25 (citing MARY JOHNSON, MAKE THEM GO AWAY: CLINT EASTWOOD,
CHRISTOPHER REEVE, AND THE CASE AGAINST DISABILITY RJGHTS (2003)). For an argument that the
onset of disability need not be seen by tort law as giving rise to hedonic damages on the ground of diminution of enjoyment of life, see Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic
Adaptation, and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745 (2007).
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the now-quadriplegic protagonist,47 justifies its conclusion by equating the
protagonist's disability "with illness and death."48 This type of imagery, he
avers, manifests in externally imposed barriers that ought to be challenged
for effectively excluding people with disabilities from work, social activities, and educational opportunities. 49 Disability Harassment is therefore
valuable for demonstrating and discussing an ugly form of human behavior
that people engage in and contribute to, 50 but do not like to think or talk
about. 51
In providing examples of harassment as a form of intentional discrimination, Disability Harassment acknowledges that these cases are only the
"tip of a very large mass." 52 Weber's work draws insights from social science research suggesting that discomfort and anxiety relating to disability
can lead nondisabled people to deliberately stigmatize people with disabilities. 53 Yet, this mass may be even larger than is acknowledged by the
book. 54 While "existential anxiety" 55 can lead to harassment, intentional
discrimination is not the only potential consequence.
A growing body of legal and social science research suggests that the
discomfort generated by minorities, women, and people with disabilities in
the workplace also leads to less-acknowledged, even unconscious forms of
discrimination. 56 Like the blunt disability harassment Weber discusses,

47

WEBER, supra note 10, at 23-24.
/d. at 24.
49
/d. at 23-24.
50
Weber also discusses the manner in which the much publicized Terry Schiavo case distorted public discourse regarding disability. /d. at 23; cf Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability, Life, Death, and
Choice, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 425 (2006) (describing the politics within the disability rights community on life and death issues).
51
Historically, this has been the case with various types of disabilities, and perhaps especially true
regarding individuals with intellectual disabilities, who have been subjected to involuntary institutionalization and sterilization.
52
WEBER, supra note I 0, at I.
53
See WEBER, supra note 10, at 2 (citing Michelle Fine & Adrienne Asch, Disability Beyond
Stigma: Social Interaction, Discrimination, and Activism, 44 J. Soc. ISSUES 3 (1988) for the proposition
that stigma stems from others' reactions to people with disabilities rather than from the aspects of such
disabilities).
54
See generally Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue, III, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 1133
(1990) ("[Eighty to ninety] percent of employment discrimination cases filed in federal court do not
produce a published opinion.").
55
The term originates with Harlan Hahn, a political scientist at the University of Southern California and one of the founders of the disability studies movement, who asserted that the fear of becoming
disabled results in a desire to segregate people with disabilities from the mainstream. Harlan Hahn, Antidiscrimination Laws and Social Research on Disability: The Minority Group Perspective, 14 BEHAV.
SCI. & L. 41, 45 (1996); Harlan Hahn, Toward a Politics of Disability: Definitions, Disciplines, and
Policies, 22 Soc. SCI. J. 87,93-96, 100 (1985).
56
See infra Part II.
48
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courts and legislatures have found that this less blatant variant of discrimination is difficult to confront and address.
Accordingly, the next Parts pursue Weber's arguments-involving the
social construction of disability and the need for robust antidiscrimination
policy to ensure inclusion-beyond the realm of intentional discrimination.
Part II sets forth the literature on unconscious bias generally, and specifically as it relates to employees with disabilities. Part III explores ways that
the socially imposed stereotypes, prejudice, and stigma that Weber so
thoughtfully documents can be confronted in regard to individuals with
psycho-social disabilities in the workplace, and explains the social benefits
of eradicating those barriers.
II. UNCONSCIOUS DISCRIMINATION
By illustrating the continuing role of harassment against persons with
disabilities, and then demonstrating the statutory bases available to remedy
this practice, Weber provides judges, lawyers, and rights advocates with the
means to combat disability-based stigma and subordination. Harassment is
a particularly pernicious form of discrimination that builds and maintains
obstructions and hierarchies between the mainstream population and those
with differences. In this respect, Weber ably demonstrates how harassment
and its exclusionary dynamic affect people with disabilities when they are
characterized as "other." 57
Disability Harassment observes that many nondisabled people are uncomfortable interacting with people with disabilities, 58 a behavior that other
commentators assert derives from animus. 59 Although there is some support
for this position, 60 most scholars believe (as does Weber) that the main psychological feelings differentiating people with disabilities from the mainstream are pity, paternalism, and existential anxiety. 61 This point is ironic
57

Weber explains that "disability harassment constantly reinforces the message that the child with
disabilities does not belong and that nothing he or she does can change that reality." WEBER, supra note
I 0, at 66. Consequently, these "negative attitudes that the children encounter at school are likely to follow them the rest of their lives, harming them in the workplace and other settings." !d.
58
See id. at 2 (citing Fine & Asch, supra note 53).
59
E.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 5 (1963)
(this classic treatment asserts that "we believe the person with a stigma is not quite human"); see also,
e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,462 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("[The treatment of people with mental disabilities] in its virulence and bigotry rivaled, and indeed paralleled, the worst excesses of Jim Crow."); Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples,
Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1341 (1993) (identifying intolerance and discrimination as part
and parcel ofthe reasons for excluding people with disabilities from equal social participation).
60
See Stein & Waterstone, supra note 16, at 898-99 (summarizing statutory, anecdotal, and case
law evidence supporting this view, without opining on its veracity).
61
See, e.g., IMAGES OF THE DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES (Alan Gartner & Tom Joe eds., 1987)
(demonstrating how the disabled are characterized as feeble or incapable, and are often objectified); Chai
Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under the Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why?
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and perhaps counterintuitive in a book about harassment wherein the most
evident feelings toward those with disabilities are overt discrimination and
mistreatment. This is especially true when ill treatment is attributable to
good intentions gone astray.
Nevertheless, it is these more complex, and at times benign or even
well-intentioned, responses to disability that result in imperceptible judgments or behaviors that over time exclude people with disabilities from social opportunities. 62 As such, these socially mediated actions are analogous
to the unconscious bias affecting mainstream societal perceptions of women
and minorities, even amongst people who profess strong egalitarian beliefs.63 In both contexts, the elusive nature of this prejudice contributes to it
being an intractable problem. 64 Such widespread preconceptions, for example, contribute to minority group members internalizing negative selfperceptions and disbelieving their capabilities. 65 The result is a vicious circle that can make harassing behavior and the norms that support it even
more potent. 66
Legal literature refers to the manifestation of less acknowledged bias in
the workplace as "unconscious" or "second generation" discrimination. 67
And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 165 (2000) ("[T]he public's need
to define a person who uses a wheelchair as 'disabled' ... derives from the idea that disabled people
lack value and are to be pitied.").
62
See generally David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899,
899 (1993) ("[M]uch employment discrimination is the result of tortious acts that are most appropriately
described as negligent.").
63 See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 331-44 (1987). This type of unconscious bias is widespread. See
Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Opposite of a Great Truth Is Also True: Homage to Koan #7, in
PERSPECTIVJSM IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE YIN AND YANG OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS 127, 130-38
(John. T. Jost et al. eds., 2004) (using an "implicit association test," which assesses bias by measuring
the spread between individual association and categorical status, to demonstrate that unconscious bias is
widespread); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination
Law, 94 CAL. L. REv. I, 5-10 (2006) (reviewing literature on unconscious bias).
64
See generally Christine Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1290
(1987) (describing the difficulty of breaking down legal barriers to gender equality); Michael Selmi,
Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REv. 701,768 (2006) ("Absent the smoking
gun, racial epithets, or other explicit exclusionary practices, it has been, and remains, hard to convince
courts that intentional discrimination exists.").
65
See DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND IDENTITY IN THE
LIVES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 67-69 (2003) (recounting interviews in which disabled Americans
described socially induced self-distaste and the way that that feeling impacted their life choices).
66
Like other self-fulfilling prophecies, this is because of a catch-22: certain workers are disadvantaged in the workplace because they are believed to have less value. In turn, those workers invest less in
their own development and seek fewer opportunities commensurate with their abilities. See David A.
Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical
Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1640 (1991) (arguing that discrimination law should not focus on discrete
events, but should provide incentives for nondiscriminatory employment).
67 See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 63, at 8-15; Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L.
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According to this view, occupational features such as informal norms, networking, training, mentoring systems, and evaluations all provide ample
cover for decisionmaking that is based on bias and stereotypes. 68 As Linda
Hamilton Krieger rightly notes, a good deal of prejudiced employment decisions do not "result ... from discriminatory motivation, as current legal
models presume, but from a variety of unintentional categorization-related
judgment errors characterizing normal human cognitive function." 69 She
further points out that categorization is so deeply ingrained into our normal
mode of mediating the world that we often fail to recognize when we have
treated others differently because they do not belong to our individual group
identity category. 70 A simple but clear example of how unconscious bias
manifests in discriminatory employment determinations is differential
treatment by prospective employers of identically qualified job candidates
based on the perceived ethnic origins of those candidates' names. 71 Such
discrimination may become more frequent in the modern labor marketplace
as employment becomes less permanent, and job searches more frequent.
Second generation discrimination thus quietly and invidiously prevents
nonmainstream employees from equal opportunities and experiences in the
workplace. 72 Although most of the research in this area focuses on racial
and sexual biases and stereotyping, there is reason to believe these issues
hold just as applicable for the disability category. People with disabilities
are often viewed as inauthentic workers/ 3 meaning that society has not yet
embraced the notion that employees with disabilities have an equally valu-

REv. 1161 (1995) (suggesting that a large number of biased employment decisions result from a variety
of unintentional categorization-related judgment errors); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458,468-474 (2001).
68
See Sturm, supra note 67, at 468-69; see also Bagenstos, supra note 63, at 8-9; Krieger, supra
note 67, at 1188.
69
Krieger, supra note 67, at 1161.
70
/d. at 1163-64. For a defense of nonprejudical categorization as both natural and necessary, see
FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES (2003).
71
See generally Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being
"Regarded as" Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal are White, 2005 WIS.
L. REV. 1283, 1283-85 (discussing employer decisions based on perceived racial origins, and suggesting
the extension of Title VII as a remedy); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and
Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination
(Nat' I Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9873, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w9873.
72
Sturm, supra note 67, at 460 ("Exclusion is frequently difficult to trace directly to intentional,
discrete actions of particular actors, and may sometimes be visible only in the aggregate. Structures of
decisionrnaking, opportunity, and power fail to surface these patterns of exclusion, and themselves produce differential access and opportunity.").
73
See Stein & Waterstone, supra note 16, at 913 ("Much as the circumstances of people of color
and women were once ignored in the workplace, employers either create or continue to maintain physical and administrative environments that exclude those with disabilities."). For a discussion of "inauthentic workers," see Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, I 00 COLUM. L. REv. 1881, 1919-28 (2000).
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able role to play in the workplace. 74 Social cognition research demonstrates
convincingly that "stereotypes often work independently of invidious animus, by functioning as cognitive constructs, categories, or organizing principles, which are triggered automatically when someone perceives a social
event," as well as how he or she recalls those events. 75 Historical, 76 sociological,77 public choice, 78 and judicially influenced79 reasons also support the
lack of acceptance of employees with disabilities.
Courts and legislatures have been vexed by the problem of second generation discrimination. Specifically, it is unclear to what extent prevailing
conceptions of employment discrimination law cover unconscious discrimination. Commentators weigh in on both sides of the issue. 80 In response,
Susan Sturm advocates a "structural" approach to these problems, whereby
courts, workplaces, employers, lawyers, and mediating organizations work
together to construct a regime that engages in proactive problem solving. 81
Others are less optimistic that this realistically could happen. 82
For purposes of this Review Essay, we do not attempt comprehensive
solutions to the pervasive issue of unconscious bias, although we have previously weighed in on approaches to address structural discrimination in the

74

This may account for the different treatment accorded to ADA employment cases and ADA nonemployment cases. See generally Waterstone, supra note 39 (finding that ADA Title II and III cases are
more pro-plaintiff than Title I cases).
75
Michelle A. Travis, Perceived Disabilities, Social Cognition, and "Innocent Mistakes,"
55 V AND. L. REV. 481,489--490 (2002).
76
See, e.g., DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE 4 ( 1984) ("The very act of defining a disability category determines what is expected of the nondisabled-what injuries, diseases, incapacities,
and problems they will be expected to tolerate in their normal working lives.").
77
See, e.g., RUTH O'BRIEN, CRIPPLED JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF MODERN DISABILITY POLICY IN
THE WORKPLACE (2000) (arguing that modem disability employment practices are influenced by vocational rehabilitation policies that only integrate disabled workers who have fully adapted themselves to
the workplace).
78
See, e.g., Richard V. Burkhauser, Post-ADA: Are People with Disabilities Expected to Work?,
549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 71, 72-78 (1997) (questioning whether the ADA was designed in a fashion that allowed the disabled the choice of working, let alone the support mechanisms
necessary to that choice).
79
See Stein, supra note 27, at 629-36 (describing how the Supreme Court does not view disabled
workers as belonging in the workplace to the same degree as nondisabled workers); see also Mary
Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the Antidiscrimination Project,
35 RUTGERS L.J. 861, 918 (2004) ("As a practical matter, persons with disabilities are far more likely
than are blacks or women to regularly face built-in headwinds in the form of performance standards, job
structure, or workplace environment.").
8
Compare, e.g., AmyL. Wax, Discrimination As Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129 (1999) (arguing that
employers should not be held liable for unconscious discrimination), with Michael Selmi, Response to
Professor Wax: Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233 (1999) (arguing
that unconscious discrimination is controllable and thus should be subject to legal remedies).
81
See Sturm, supra note 67, at 479.
82
See Bagenstos, supra note 63, at 20-34 (expressing skepticism that Professor Sturm's recommendations will work on a larger scale).

°
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disability employment context. 83 Rather, we start with one of Weber's core
arguments that discrimination must be broadly defined to bring down social
barriers precluding people with disabilities from labor market participation.
We apply this argument in a direction that Weber does not: to a particularly
vexing case, that of workers (or would-be workers) with mental disabilities.
Weber presents a compelling snapshot of the problem of harassment
facing workers (and others) with disabilities. However, as discussed in the
Introduction, there is a larger universe of people with psycho-social disabilities who do not get the chance to work because prejudice bars their entry into the workplace. There are strong and pervasive unconscious biases
against people with mental disabilities, so much so that contact theory (the
notion that day-to-day interaction with an otherwise socially excluded
group helps to break down prejudice), 84 which Weber views as offering a
hope for reduction of stigma, 85 never has a chance to function. It is to this
subject that we now tum.

III.

PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT

Individuals with psycho-social disabilities historically have been
among the most excluded members of society. This failing has unfortunately continued despite the ADA's strong employment mandate. Similarly, insufficient academic attention has been paid to the employment of
persons with psycho-social disabilities. We therefore highlight the case for
why individuals with mental disabilities normatively should, and reasonably
can, be included in the workplace.

A. A Most Vexing Case
The ADA has not increased the overall employment rate of Americans
with disabilities. 86 Among subgroups of people with specific disabilities,
the post-ADA experiences of individuals with psycho-social disabilities are
among the most vexing as far as realizing the ADA's goals of achieving inclusive employment and economic equality. 87
83 See Stein & Waterstone, supra note 16 (advocating a form of collective action using class actions
and disparate impact unified by a theory of "pandisability").
84 See discussion infra at text accompanying notes 100-04.
85
See WEBER, supra note I 0, at 6 ("Lack of daily contact at a level of true equality with persons
with disabilities promotes and constantly reinforces stereotypes.").
86
See generally THE DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: A POLICY PUZZLE
(David C. Stapleton & Richard V. Burkhauser eds., 2003) (collected econometric studies and policy essays). For a comparative perspective on why this may be so, see Michael Ashley Stein & Penelope J.S.
Stein, Beyond Disability Civil Rights, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1203 (2007).
87
See Kathryn Moss et al., Mediation of Employment Discrimination Disputes Involving Persons
with Psychiatric Disabilities, 53 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 988 (2002) (finding that employers are less
likely to engage in mediation with employees who have psychiatric disabilities than with employees
who have other disabilities); Jeffrey Swanson et al., Justice Disparities: Does the ADA Enforcement System Treat People with Psychiatric Disabilities Fairly?, 66 MD. L. REv. 94, 95 (2006) (fmding that peo-
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The vignettes in Disability Harassment make evident the harassment
targeted at subgroups of people with diverse disabilities in the workforce. 88
This authentication is much needed, yet it still does not present as complete
a picture as possible. Research firmly establishes that people with mental
disabilities are subjected to greater prejudice than are people with physical
disabilities. 89 For example, one study comparing attitudes regarding specific disabilities determined that people with psycho-social disabilities suffer greater stigma than people with criminal records. 90
Adding to this difficulty, the popular media often portray people with
mental disabilities as threatening or dangerous. 91 Moreover, pervasive cultural myths claim that psychiatric disabilities are either the fault of the impaired person (for example, for not taking their medication) or that they are
something other than legitimate disabilities (for example, viewing a person
with severe depression as "blue" rather than as experiencing a psychiatric
impairment). 92 Positive cultural depictions are rare, with a small number of

pie with psychiatric disabilities are less successful in the legal system than are those with other disabilities).
88

See, e.g., WEBER, supra note 10, at 32 (discussing Glen Zale, a war veteran with post-traumatic
stress disorder who was harassed by coworkers who would make loud noises and then laugh when he
hid under furniture).
89
See Jane Byeff Korn, Crazy (Mental Illness under the ADA), 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 585, 586-87 (2003) ("[P]eople with mental disabilities are more feared, more stigmatized, discriminated against
more often, and are seen as more likely to commit acts of violence than are people with physical disabilities."); see a/so NAT'L INST. ON MENTAL HEALTH, SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON MENTAL
HEALTH 6 (1999) (noting that although for people with physical disabilities the most common form of
discrimination is paternalism, in the case of mental disability, discrimination is manifested as bias, distrust, stereotyping, fear, embarrassment, anger, or avoidance).
90
John L. Tringo, The Hierarchy of Preference Toward Disability Groups, 4 J. SPECIAL Eouc. 295
(1970) (the ranking, from least stigmatized to most, was: ulcers, arthritis, asthma, diabetes, heart disease,
amputation, blindness, deafness, stroke, cancer, old age, paraplegia, epilepsy, dwarfism, cerebral palsy,
hunchback, tuberculosis, criminal record, mental retardation, alcoholism, mental illness); see also K.M.
Goldstein & S. Blackman, Generalizations Regarding Deviant Groups, 37 PSYCHOL. REP. 278 (1975)
(finding that people were most likely to have negative attitudes toward alcoholics, drug addicts, and
criminals, followed by those with mental illness and mental retardation, and then physical disability).
91
See Ann Hubbard, The ADA, the Workplace, and the Myth of the "Dangerous Mentally Ill,"
34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 849, 850-52 (2001); see a/so NAT'L INST. ON MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 89,
at 7 ("[In the 1990s], in comparison with the 1950s, the public's perception of mental illness more frequently incorporated violent behavior."); Bruce G. Link et al., Public Conceptions of Mental Illness:
Labels, Causes, Dangerousness, and Social Distance, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1328, 1328 (1999)
("Rather than waning, ... stereotypes of dangerousness are actually on the increase .... "); Shirley Star,
The Public's Ideas About Mental Illness 6 (presented at the annual meeting of the Nat'! Ass'n for Mental Health, Nov. 5, 1955), available at http://www.norc.org/NR!rdonlyres/CADE8353-C5D3-4FB08C84-40E2FOECECF4/0/sstar__public_1955.pdf.
92
See generally Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism," 46 SMU L. REv. 373, 391-98 (1992) (arguing
that prejudice against disabled people is analogous to "racism, sexism, heterosexism and ethnic bigotry").
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individuals with psycho-social disabilities presented as heroic exceptions
for "overcoming" the mammoth impediments of mental disability. 93
Michael Perlin, an intrepid advocate for individuals with psycho-social
disabilities, suggests the root cause of these social constructs is "sanism," a
phenomenon he characterizes as "an irrational prejudice" against mental
disability. According to Perlin, sanism has "the same quality and character"
as "other irrational prejudices" such as "racism, sexism, homophobia, and
ethnic bigotry."94 Unfortunately, sanist preconceptions currently impact the
legal system as well as the workplace. For instance, one study links this
schema to the fact that people with psychiatric disabilities fare significantly
worse than people with nonpsychiatric disabilities in ADA employment
cases, both in terms of their success rates and their feelings of satisfaction
with the process. 95 It is also notable that one legal commentator even claims
that mentally disabled workers extract "hedonic costs" in the form of inevitably negative "emotional contagions"96 in nondisabled people who are
forced to associate with them. 97
We agree with Perlin that many existing barriers individuals with mental disabilities face are socially constructed and premised on exaggerated
and mutable baseline assumptions regarding psycho-social disability. 98 So,
too, the assumption that mental disability inevitably leads to inadequate
93

For a discussion of the myth of overcoming disability, see Michael Ashley Stein, From Crippled
to Disabled: The Legal Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities, 43 EMORY L.J. 245, 262--63
(1994).
94
Michael L. Perlin, ''Things Have Changed:" Looking at Non-Institutional Mental Disability Law
Through the Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 535, 536 (2003).
95
See Swanson et al., supra note 87, at 95, 132-36.
96
Elizabeth F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness, Hedonic Costs, and the
ADA, 94 GEO. L.J. 399, 401 (2006) ("Emotional contagion is the process by which we absorb the emotions of nearby others through largely unconscious mechanisms."). We use the phrase "emotional contagion" because it is a term of art applied by commentators. See, e.g., Gerald Schoenwolf, Emotional
Contagion: Behavioral Induction in Individuals and Groups, 15 MOD. PSYCHOANALYSIS 49, 50 (1990).
Note that some may find the phrase offensive as harkening to notions of contagion associated with offensive racist beliefs.
97
See Emens, supra note 96, at 401. The normative thrust of Emens's argument endeavors to be
positive by arguing that hedonic costs must be borne by the employer, via her employees, as part of the
ADA's mandate of social inclusion for persons with disabilities. We strongly disagree with Emens to
the extent that she believes that individuals with psycho-social disabilities inescapably create emotional
contagions and extract costs.
98
For example, the "crazy" employee who could tum violent at any moment is largely a myth. An
excellent analysis of this topic can be found in Hubbard, supra note 91. See also Hearing on the Nat' I
Insts. of Health Before the Subcomm. on Labor, Health, & Human Servs., Educ. & Related Agencies of
the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong. 377 (1996) (statement of Stephen Hyman, Director, Nat'l
lost. of Mental Health) ("! can state without reservation that research shows no biomedical justification
for differentiating serious mental illness from other serious and potentially chronic disorders of the
nervous system such as stroke, brain tumor or paralysis."); Randy Borum et al., Assessing and Managing Violence Risk in Clinical Practice, J. PRAC. PSYCHIATRY & BEHAV. HEALTH 205, 208 (1996); John
Monahan & Jean Arnold, Violence by People with Menta/Illness: A Consensus Statement by Advocates
and Researchers, 19 PSYCHIATRIC REHAB. J. 67,70 (1996).
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work performance. 99 Accordingly, the next sections elaborate our arguments for why occupational integration is socially beneficial as well as
practically feasible.

B. The Importance ofIntegrating People with Mental Disabilities
into the Workplace
Although a few commentators discuss the normative desirability of integrating people with psycho-social disabilities into the workplace, discussions of the multifarious advantages that accrue to society, workplaces, and
fellow employees without psycho-social disabilities are notably absent in
the legal literature. We therefore set forth in this Section an initial precis of
these positive effects.

1. Social Benefits to Society.-Integrating persons with mental disabilities into the workplace creates a society-wide social benefit by helping
to erode existing prejudices and misconceptions regarding the group. This
dynamic has long been recognized by contact theory, a key theoretical underpinning of the larger antidiscrimination project. Originally developed in
the race context, contact theory posits that socially constructed stereotypes
and hostility can be improved by close contact between members of different races. 100 This notion was a key part of the assault against "separate but
equal" in Brown v. Board ofEducation. 101
Although contact theory (but not its normative goals) has been criticized as naive and overly simplistic, 102 it generally has been defended as
empirically robust and has withstood the test of time. 103 Because the workplace is a social arena where people work together closely, it has proven a
particularly fertile ground for helping to overcome discriminatory animus
by putting members of disliked or simply unfamiliar groups alongside
mainstream society members who might otherwise be potential discriminators.104 Yet contact theory has been underapplied regarding individuals with
psycho-social disabilities, and to the extent that it has been discussed,
99 See Hubbard, supra note 91, at 892-93 ("[I]t is hard to imagine a job for which a diagnosis of a
mental disorder would 'by its very nature' prevent a person from performing the job ... .");see also
James C. Beck, Epidemiology of Mental Disorder and Violence: Beliefs and Research Findings,
2 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY I, 5 (1994).
100
See GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 264, 267 (1958); see also GUNNAR
MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1962).
101 347 U.S. 483,494-95 (1954).
102 See, e.g., Lee Sigelman & Susan Welch, The Contact Hypothesis Revisited: Black-White Interaction and Positive Racial Attitudes, 71 Soc. FORCES 781,781-82 (1993) (finding empirical support for
contact theory).
103 This is the thesis of a persuasive book. CYNTHIA ESTIUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW
WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 74-76 (2003).
104 /d. at I 03-17. Unfortunately, Estlund omits individuals with disabilities from an otherwise inclusive book.
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commentators, including Weber, focus on its limits rather than on its potential. Nor has contact theory been developed in the context of the growing
prevalence of information and communication technology, wherein individuals with psycho-social disabilities can interact with fellow workers
while also maintaining a comfortable distance.
Empirical evidence substantiates the idea that occupational contact can
change attitudes toward individuals with discemable disabilities. 105 One
study, based on a vignette asking people to judge the work performance of a
secretary who used a wheelchair, concluded that people who had previously
hired, worked with, or supervised an employee with a disability ranked the
secretary higher. 106 Similarly, in the educational context, another study
found that students who had exposure to and familiarity with individuals
with disabilities exhibited more positive attitudes toward disabled students.107 And a study of nurses' attitudes toward their patients with disabilities found that prior work and clinical experiences with this population
resulted in favorable perceptions of people with disabilities. 108
Research likewise suggests that contact increases tolerance and positive attitudes toward workers with psycho-social disabilities. 109 One empirical study compared the attitudes of employers who respectively did and did
not employ people with psychiatric disabilities. 110 It found that employers
with mentally disabled workers perceived it to be significantly easier to accommodate those disabilities than did nonemployers of similarly situated
workers. 111 The study also found that the employers with psycho-socially
disabled employees were significantly more likely than the nonemployers to
rebut social stereotypes and equally value those employees with disabilities.
Specifically, employers with mentally disabled workers believed that employees with mental disabilities display equivalent motivation to work, fol-

105

The subjects of these particular studies possessed discernable physical disabilities. Although
more research regarding contact theory and mental disabilities is needed, as the subsequent paragraph
discusses, there is evidence that the same conclusions should apply, at least to individuals with discernable mental disabilities.
106
Cheryl H. Smith et al., Attitudes Toward & Peiformance Evaluations of Workers with Disabilities, 16 J. APPLIED REHAB. COUNSELING 39 (1985); see also Gil Elmaleh, A Study of Attitudes Toward
Employees with Disabilities 87 (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yeshiva University) (on file
with the Northwestern University Law Review) (reporting on a questionnaire-based study finding a relationship between contact with disabled people and positive attitudes toward them).
107 See James A. Pitman & John R. Slate, Students' Familiarity with and Attitudes Toward the
Rights ofStudents Who are Disabled, 18 J. APPLIED REHAB. COUNSELING 38,39 (1993).
108
See Barbara Biordi & Marilyn H. Oermann, The Effect of Prior Experiences in a Rehabilitation
Setting on Students' Attitudes Toward the Disabled, 18 REHAB. NURSING 95-98 (1993).
109
See OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-BP-BBS-124, PSYCHIATRIC
DISABILITIES, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE ADA 80 ( 1994) [hereinafter OTA REPORT).
110
See J.A. Cook & Lisa Razzano, Cultivation and Maintenance of Relationships with Employers of
Persons with Psychiatric Disabilities, 17 PSYCHOSOCIAL REHAB. J. I 03 ( 1994).
111
/d. at 110.
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low directions equally well, are not more likely to be injured on the job, and
are not quicker to anger than are other workers. 112
Another study examined employer attitudes toward hiring persons with
psycho-social disabilities in four particular areas (symptomatology, work
personality, work performance, and administrative concerns) across eight
employment sectors. 113 The results of this analysis show that employers
with a history of hiring persons with mental disabilities expressed significantly lower levels of concern about work performance and administrative
challenges. 114 In consequence, the researchers suggested that experience in
hiring persons with psycho-social disabilities may lead to the lessening of
an employer's concerns regarding those individuals. 115 They further suggested "that fears about psycho-social disabilities are allayed when persons
with disabilities are successfully employed" and demonstrate that they need
not burden employers. 116 These results confirm earlier analyses. Moreover,
various studies show that educational interventions, sensitivity trainings,
and mentoring programs can be effective in changing beliefs and attitudes
about disability. 117 In sum, empirical evidence demonstrates that stereotypes about mental disability are malleable and amenable to change through
inclusive workplaces.
Changing attitudes are of great social benefit as part of a larger effort
to make the workplace, and through it society at large, more inclusive of individuals with differences. Historically, women, African Americans, and
people with disabilities have been viewed by society as atypical workers.

112

/d.

113

Edward Diksa & E. Sally Rogers, Employer Concerns About Hiring Persons with Psychiatric
Disability: Results of the Employer Attitude Questionnaire, 40 REHAB. COUNSELING BULL. 31 ( 1996).
114
!d. at 38.
115
!d. at 41.
116
!d.; see, e.g., J.M. Levy et al., Employment of Persons with Severe Disabilities in Large Businesses in the United States, 14 INT'L J. REHAB. RES. 323-32 (1991) (finding that employers with previous experience in hiring persons with disabilities were more willing to hire persons with disabilities
again).
117 See Courtney Shelton Hunt & Brandon Hunt, Changing Attitudes Toward People with Disabilities: Experimenting with an Educational Intervention, 16 J. MANAGERIAL ISSUES 266, 274--76 (2004)
("Although training professionals could develop entire programs focused on issues associated with people with disabilities, such extensive efforts may not be necessary. Even a brief lecture ... can significantly influence people's attitudes .... [I]t could be relatively easy to incorporate training on people
with disabilities into existing programs, such as diversity training."). See generally David Hagner, What
We Know About Preventing and Managing Coworker Resentment or Rejection, 34 J. APPLIED REHAB.
COUNSELING 28 (2003) (on the effectiveness of mentoring); Robert Loo, Attitudes Toward Employing
Persons with Disabilities: A Test of the Sympathy-Discomfort Categories, 34 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL.
2200, 2212 (2004) (suggesting that a simple self-assessment exercise regarding attitudes toward disabilities in training could cause employees to critically reflect on their own attitudes); Frank R. Rusch et al.,
Descriptive Analysis of Interactions Between Co-Workers and Supported Employees, 29 MENTAL
RETARDATION 207, 210 (1991) (noting a "striking" finding that a large percentage of coworkers supported employees with mental retardation in the workplace).
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When adjustments are made, they happen last to unfamiliar differences. 118 Biases and misperceptions fall away when differences become more familiar.
Assertions once made about women and African Americans, for example, are
now considered unacceptable. 119 Eliminating parallel biases and misperceptions that unnecessarily exclude people with mental disabilities from the
workplace is the next step in this progressive social reconstruction. In this respect, workplace integration of individuals with psycho-social disabilities
can achieve several important attitudinal changes that are normatively beneficial to a diverse society. As Professor Sturm notes in the race and gender
context, "[t]he project of achieving inclusive institutions is not only about
eliminating discrimination or even increasing the representation of previously excluded groups. It is about creating the conditions enabling people
of all races and genders to realize their capabilities as they understand
them." 120 Removing institutional barriers thereby fosters the more general
goal of full and fair participation for all groups. 121
Congress passed the ADA to end the historic isolation and segregation
of disabled persons; 122 to combat discrimination in employment for a particularly vulnerable group; 123 and to create equality of opportunity, full participation in community life, and economic self sufficiencyY4 People with
mental disabilities are among those in the most, not least, need of the
ADA's protections. For people with psycho-social disabilities (like all people) securing and maintaining gainful employment is crucial to economic
self-sufficiency. 125
More trenchantly, employment is a hallmark of true citizenship because
it enables individuals to participate meaningfully in society. 126 As one commentator notes, "paid work, and even full-time work, is becoming a nearly
118

See generally Stein, supra note 27.
!d. at 584; see also Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, Equal Protection, and the
Supreme Court: Standing at the Crossroads of Progressive and Retrogressive Logic in Constitutional
Classification, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 81, 82 (2002) (arguing that stereotypes regarding woman are
no longer the subject of judicial deference).
120
See Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247,250 (2006).
121 /d.
119

122

42 U.S.C. § 12,101A(2) (2000).
/d.§ 12,101A(3) (describing the legislation's goal of ending discrimination in employment); see
also id. § 12,101A(6)-(7) (describing the disabled as a discrete and insular minority).
124
For an account of the ADA as "a perfect storm" that combined politically compatible liberal and
neoclassical goals of removing disabled people from federal government dependency, see Samuel R.
Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 921
(2003).
125
See generally id. See also Swanson et al., supra note 87, at 116-17 (on the economic benefits of
employment for people with mental disabilities).
126
See Deirdre M. Smith, The Paradox of Personality: Mental Illness, Employment Discrimination,
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 17 GEO. MASON U. CIV. Rrs. L.J. 79, 142 (2006) ("Maintaining gainful employment is a prerequisite to being seen as a full citizen.").
123
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universal experience of adult life." 127 The workplace is the one social forum
that brings diverse communities together. 128 It is where meaningful conversations occur, where meaningful relationships form, and where loyalty to
coworkers is forged. 129 Being a part of this community is a crucial way for
people with disabilities to be full members of society, and to be deemed as
such. 130 Likewise, including mentally disabled people in the workplace
provides them a mechanism through which to positively affect the lives of
their coworkers.
Integrating individuals with psycho-social disabilities, specifically,
also counteracts a number of pervasive misconceptions, the elimination of
each of which redounds to society's benefit. First is the erroneous notion
that mentally disabled people are a distinct and separate group, apart from
the social norm. In fact, "[a]bout half of all the people in the United States
will develop one or more mental disorders in their lifetimes" and in the
course of "any year, one of every four people in this country fits the definition of 'mentally ill. "' 131 A second myth ascribes permanence to mental
disability. Yet, people with significant psycho-social disabilities, including
schizophrenia spectrum disorder, often recover sufficiently to maintain successful employment. 132
Perhaps the most significant cultural myth is the most obvious one: the
notion that group members are unable to be effective employees. 133 Exam127

ESTLUND, supra note I 03, at 23.
/d. at 3 ("[T]he typical workplace is a veritable hotbed of sociability and cooperation, of constructive and mostly friendly interactions among co-workers day after day, and often year after year. ...
of all the places where adults interact with others, the workplace is likely to the most demographically
diverse." (emphasis added)).
129
Estlund examines these bonds that are formed at work in detail. "[W]orking adults have more
meaningful conversations-conversations about things that they consider important-with co-workers
than anyone outside of their families." See ESTLUND, supra note I 03, at 24. "Over weeks, months, or
years of working together, co-workers learn about each others' lives and develop feelings of affection,
empathy, sympathy, and loyalty for each other." !d. at 6. "Loyalty to companies may be disappearing,
but loyalty to colleagues is not." /d. at 87; see also Swanson et al., supra note 87, at 116-17 ("The ramifications of employment discrimination [for people with mental disabilities] are enormous. The ability
to find and maintain a job is essential to full inclusion in everyday life. In addition to the economic
benefits it provides, employment offers the chance for independence, the improvement of skills, friendships, self-esteem, a sense of purpose, and meaningful participation in society.").
130
See Smith, supra note 126, at 142 ("[S]ociety's perception of a 'disabled' person is one who
does not work and therefore is not a full, responsible member of society."); Sturm, supra note 120, at
324 ("Workplaces are important intermediate institutions through which citizens make their voices heard
and determine their opportunity to participate fully in economic and political life.").
131
William J. Cromie, Half of Us Suffer from Menta/Illness, Survey Finds, HARV. U. GAZETTE,
June 16, 2005, available at http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2005/06.16/05-suicide.html.
132
See Zlatka Russinova et al., Correlates of Vocational Recovery for Persons with Schizophrenia,
14 lNT'L REv. PSYCHIATRY 303, 306 (2002) (reporting that seventy-five percent of schizophrenic study
participants had uninterrupted employment in the previous two years).
133
See Schultz, supra note 73, at 1892 (first using the term "inauthentic workers" in the context of
views associated with women employees); see also Harlan Hahn, Advertising the Acceptably Employable Image: Disability and Capitalism, 15 POL'Y STUD. J. 551 (1987) (averring that the dominant model
128
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ples of people with mental disabilities who have been successful in the
workplace demonstrate that this is indeed a myth. Elyn Saks, the Associate
Dean and Orrin B. Evans Professor of Law, Psychology, and Psychiatry and
the Behavioral Sciences at the University of Southern California (USC)
Law School, recently wrote a book about her experiences as a law professor
with schizophrenia. 134 Saks, whose condition was so pronounced that she
spent time in mental hospitals, details the many times she was placed in restraints against her will. 135 That she was forced to keep her disability a secret until writing her book is a testament to the stigma, stereotypes, and
societal dismissal she witnessed. 136 Saks considers herself fortunate that her
colleagues at USC have been understanding and allowed modifications such
as substituting teaching loads (that cause anxiety, which can trigger psychotic episodes) with research responsibilities. 137
Saks, of course, is not alone as a person with a mental disability who
has achieved professional success, even in legal academia. James Jones, a
professor of law at the University of Louisville Law School, recently wrote
of his own (heretofore secret) battle with mental illness, in his case bipolar
disorder. 138 His account sounds themes similar to Professor Saks's: selfaccommodation and nondisclosure because of fear of stigma from colleagues and students. 139 Susan Stefan argues that people with psychiatric
disabilities do not just work in fast food, yard work, or as janitors. 140
Rather, as she details, they are senators, television journalists, print journalists, clinical psychologists, and astronauts. 141 One might also note Ludwig

of image projected by employers seeking to develop an "industrial reserve army" was one that excluded
the participation of workers with disabilities). Carrying the point of exclusion even further, historian
Deborah Stone argues that "[t]he very act of defining a disability category determines what is expected
of the nondisabled-what injuries, diseases, incapacities, and problems they will be expected to tolerate
in their normal working lives." STONE, supra note 76, at 4.
134
See EL YN SAKS, THE CENTER CANNOT HOLD (2007).
135 !d.
136
In one particularly compelling vignette, Professor Saks describes how she applied for a volunteer position at a facility she had been previously committed to as a patient. When the head of volunteers learned about Saks's history, she withdrew the volunteer opportunity. !d. at 105-06.
137
!d. at 335.
138
See James T.R. Jones, Walking the Tightrope of Bipolar Disorder: The Secret Life of a Law Professor, 57 J. LEGAL EDUC. 349 (2008).
139
See generally id.
140
SUSAN STEFAN, HOLLOW PROMISES: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH
MENTAL DISABILITIES 7 (2002).
141
See id. at 7-8; see also KATHY CRONKJTE, ON THE EDGE OF DARKNESS: CONVERSATIONS
ABOUT CONQUERING DEPRESSION 13-20 (1994) (on Mike Wallace's account of his battles with depression); MARTHA MANNING, UNDERCURRENTS (1994) (clinical psychologist); TRACY THOMPSON, THE
BEAST: A RECKONING WITH DEPRESSION (1995) (print journalist); Dana Parsons, Bad Moods: ManicDepressives Worry About Violence Giving Ailment Bad Name, L.A. TIMES, Feb. I, 1989 (on astronaut
Buzz Aldrin).
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van Beethoven, 142 Winston Churchill, 143 Charles Dickens, 144 Albert Einstein,145 Abraham Lincoln, 146 or Isaac Newton. 147 In many ways, the workplace success of individuals with mental disabilities demonstrates how reallife events are outpacing legal reform and academic discussion: large numbers of people with mental disabilities already exist in the workplace, albeit
perhaps under fear of discovery. 148
Altering the expectations regarding work for individuals with psychosocial disabilities enables them to flourish and contribute greatly to society.149 Open and inclusive employment could assist in breaking down the
cultural taboo that requires mental disability to be hidden and unspoken,
which is in itself a sizeable burden to those with psycho-social disabilities
and their families. Providing positive cultural images of people with mental
disabilities can also alter broad misperceptions regarding their capabilities
and better enable them to lead valued and productive lives. By lessening
the impact of external factors, these effects might also potentially allow
those individuals to experience less severe disabilities.

2. Economic Benefits to Society.-There are significant economic
benefits to society that can be achieved by integrating people with mental

142

D. JABLOW HERSHMAN & JULIAN LiEB, THE KEY TO GENIUS 63-80 (1988) (on Beethoven's outbursts of anger, mood shifts, depression, manic episodes, and suicidal tendencies).
143 Richard L. Worsnop, An Ancient Malady, 37 CQ RESEARCHER 866 (Oct. 9, 1992) (on
Churchill's melancholy).
144 HERSHMAN & LiEB, supra note 142, at 106--08 (on Dickens's mania and mood swings).
145 ANTHONY STORR, THE DYNAMICS OF CREATION 61 (1972) (on Einstein's "schizoid detachment").

146
147

Worsnop, supra note 143, at 870 (on Lincoln's depression).
HERSHMAN & LEIB, supra note 142, at 46, 49 (on Newton's manic-depression and paranoia).
Although the political arena is not the same as the workplace, it can provide a barometer for evolving
social attitudes, not least of all because of the intense scrutiny to which it is subjected. In 1964 and
1988, allegations about lack of "psychological fitness" to be President helped derail the presidential
candidacies of Barry Goldwater and Michael Dukakis, respectively. Yet in 1990, Lawton Chiles won
the Florida gubernatorial race despite acknowledging his depression. In 1992, the medical records of
Nydia Velasquez, a candidate for the House, revealed depression, drug and alcohol abuse, and an attempted suicide. She assured the voters that counseling had helped her, and won the election with seventy-seven percent of the vote. OTA REPORT, supra note 109, at 33-34.
148 See Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric Disabilities, Employment
Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271 (2000).
149 Commentators also aver that employing workers with mental disabilities prevents socially harmful "churning." Samuel R. Bagenstos defines churning as a process in which "employees with hidden
conditions experience repeated cycles of being hired by unknowing employers, discharged when their
conditions are discovered, and then hired again by different unknowing employers." Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability," 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 463 (2000) (also noting that churning is inefficient because it creates "friction" in the labor market without improving the quality of
matches between employers and employees). Given the pervasive prejudice against persons with psycho-social disabilities in the workplace, one has to wonder how often people with mental disabilities are
repeatedly hired.

1372

102:1351 (2008)

Disabling Prejudice

disabilities into the workforce. 150 Simply put, social dependency, the option
when people with mental disabilities are not working, is expensive. 151 General disability-related public assistance obligations exceed $120 billion annually;152 and specifically, social insurance programs are used
disproportionately by persons with mental disabilities, and remain a hugely
increasing trend. 153 Occupational exclusion also creates a norm of non work,
which carries with it additional social dependency costs, 154 including harderto-quantify costs borne by families and friends of unemployed individuals
with psycho-social disabilities, who often must take on these obligations. 155
Additionally, studies show that hiring people with disabilities generally
can lower taxpayers' general burdens 156 and benefit the national economy. 157
One report, for example, estimated that for every one million disabled people employed,
there would be as much as a $21.2 billion annual increase in earned income; a
$1.2 billion annual decrease in means-tested cash income payments; a $286
million annual decrease in the use of food stamps; a $1.8 billion decrease in
Supplemental Security Income payments; 284,000 fewer people using Medicaid and 166,000 fewer people using Medicare. 158
Indeed, Samuel Bagenstos persuasively demonstrates that the ADA was in
large part "sold" to Congress as an effective means of decreasing disability150

See generally Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations,
53 DUKE L.J. 79, 167-77 (2003) (describing Kaldor-Hicks socially beneficial workplace accommodations).

151

See Bagenstos, supra note 149, at 463 ("[B]ringing people with disabilities into the workforce
avoids the very significant social costs of dependency."); Michael Ashley Stein, Empirical Implications
of Title I, 85 IOWA L. REv. 1671, 1677-81 (2000) (presenting empirical studies on the costs of dependency).
152 David I. Levine, Reinventing Disability Policy I (lnst. of Indus. Relations, Working Paper No.
65, 1997).
153 See STEFAN, supra note 140, at 17.
154 See AmyL. Wax, Disability, Reciprocity, and "Real Efficiency": A Unified Approach, 44 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1421, 1425 (2003) (emphasizing the costs of a norm of nonemployment).
155 For a discussion of how these obligations are gender-skewed, see JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING
GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2000). For a discussion of
how and why societies ought to compensate for that imbalance, see Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities
and Disabilities: Justice for Mentally Disabled Citizens, 30 PHIL. TOPICS 133 (2002). See generally
EVA FEDER KlTTAY, LOVE'S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND DEPENDENCY (1999) (asserting the social benefits of care giving in the disability context).
156 See, e.g., Stein, supra note 151, at 1676 n.26 (citing both The JWOD Program: Providing Cost
Savings to the Federal Government by Employing People with Disabilities (Feb. 6, 1998) and Taxpayer
Return Study, California Department of Rehabilitation Mental Health Cooperative Programs (Oct.
1995) to show that the federal government and the state of California saved a significant amount of
money by employing disabled people).

157

See Thomas N. Chirikos, Aggregate Economic Losses from Disability in the United States: A
Preliminary Assay, 67 MILBANK Q. (SUPP. 2) 59 (1989).
158 See Patricia Digh, People with Disabilities Show What They Can Do, HRMAGAZINE, June 1998,
at 141, 144 (citing Rutgers University economist Douglas Kruse).
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based dependency on public resources. 159 Although it is difficult to disaggregate social costs according to disability-specific status, it does not make
sense to accept that the ADA can work to integrate one population of people with disabilities, but not another. 160
A further, significant benefit is that eliminating workplace discrimination against individuals with mental disabilities encourages people within
that group to more fully invest in their own human capital to develop their
potential, and thereby add to the talent pool of people in the workforce. 161
Individuals with psycho-social disabilities, much like other minority group
members, will not invest in their own development if they are signaled that
certain career paths or other opportunities are inappropriate or unattainable.162 The result is a vicious circle: people are not in a position to challenge exclusion from particular prospects if they do not first consider those
options viable. 163 By contrast, altering the American workplace environment to include individuals with mental disabilities in turn creates a strong
incentive for those putative workers to enable their abilities to flourish and,
in doing so, add talents and abilities to the workplace and society.

3. Benefits to Workplaces.-Making employment opportunities inclusive to people with mental disabilities has several benefits that accrue to
employers, nondisabled employees, and the workplace environment. 164 To
159 Bagenstos, supra note 124, at 926--27. These arguments beg the question, raised in 1997 by
Burkhauser, whether despite tbese intentions tbe ADA was effectively designed to increase employment
opportunities for disabled workers. See Burkhauser, supra note 78. For a recent response in the negative, see Stein & Stein, supra note 86.
160 See generally David A. Weisbach, A Welfarist Approach to Disabilities (John M. Olin Law &
Econ., Working Paper No. 355, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=l008985 (proposing ways
that the tax system can compensate for the greater costs generally associated with economically discernable disabilities).
161 The desirability of self-investment, and the converse undesirability of underinvestment, is a
proposition held by a variety of commentators from divergent perspectives. Compare, e.g., Gary S.
Becker, Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, 70 J. POL. ECON. 9, 9 (1962) ("[Investment in human capital will] improve tbe physical and mental abilities of people and thereby raise real
income prospects"), with Ruth Colker, Hypercapitalism: Affirmative Protections for People with Disabilities, Illness and Parenting Responsibilities Under United States Law, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 213,
217-20 (1997) ("The United States has not facilitated long-term investment in human capital through
social market protection. If our choices were based on a careful study of the experience of other countries ratber than unexamined rhetoric, we might make different and more humane choices.").
162 See Michael Ashley Stein, Under the Empirical Radar: An Initial Expressive Law Analysis of
the ADA, 90 VA. L. REv. 1151, 1157-58 (2004) ("[S]ocietal pressure can prevent persons with disabilities from having a sense of entitlement in tbe workforce and in society as a whole.").
163 See supra note 66; see also Strauss, supra note 66, at I 640 ("Statistical discrimination encourages minorities to underinvest in human capital, which in turn makes statistical discrimination rational.").
164 See generally Heidi M. Berven & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Americans with
Disabilities Act Part 11-Patents and Innovations in Assistive Technology, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y 9, 85-89 (1998) (arguing for tbe wider application of technology conventionally believed
to be limited to use strictly for individuals witb disabilities).
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begin with, it is unclear whether these workers actually require accommodations, 165 and if they do require accommodations, whether these accommodations carry any significant cost. 166 It stands to reason that the majority of
accommodations will involve reconsidering methods of job performance,
rather than purchasing or providing physical alterations. There is also a
wealth of anecdotal evidence that people with psycho-social disabilities are
already in the workplace because they self-accommodate their differences.
In the case of schizophrenia, for example, they set aside time to focus away
outside voices. 167
Thus, for many the issue is recognition and tolerance, not alterations to
workplace hierarchies. 168 Consider, for example, that there is no material or
tangible difference between a daily ten minute smoking break, a daily ten
minute insulin injection break, and a daily ten minute isolation break to stop
hearing voices, beyond the employer's attitude.
Further, it bears noting that individuals with psycho-social disabilities
are often categorized as having those conditions because they do not process information in a neurally typical manner. Consequently, at a time when
more standardized tests and criteria have become the norm, 169 the very creativity that in many ways characterizes mental disability, 170 and that has in
the past served to exclude the group from the workplace, may become one
of its greatest assets. 171 People with mental disabilities may bring abilities
165

Mental disabilities are not readily discernable--pursuant to Title I, employers cannot inquire
into the history, existence, or extent of a person's disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(d)(4)(A) (2000); see
also Chai Feldblum, Medical Examinations and Inquiries Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: A
View from the Inside, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 521, 531 (1991) (analyzing "the medical examinations and inquiries section of the employment title of the ADA" using legislative history). Conversely, when a person has a disability that is not readily ascertainable and does not disclose to her employer the existence
of her disability, she will not be protected under the ADA's auspices, id., much as when a person's religious convictions prevent her from performing her employment, she is not protected under Title VII unless she had previously disclosed that limitation. See, e.g., Johnson v. Angelica Unif. Group, Inc., 762
F.2d 671 (8th Cir. 1985) (denying recourse to an employee who was terminated for missing work on religious holidays because she had not informed her employer of the holidays). This raises a very interesting (but secondary) issue relating to individuals without discernable disabilities. For the purposes of
attempting to enculturate within a firm and avoid prejudice, when should a person with a nonvisible disability disclose that disability? This is an especially pertinent question if the disability in question is an
episodic one or a mental disability that is likely to encounter strong prejudice.
166
This subject is addressed at length elsewhere. See Stein, supra note !50, at I 03-09 (presenting
and critiquing the accommodation cost studies in depth); Stein, supra note !51, at 1677-81 (same).
167
See, e.g., Stefan, supra note 148, at 307-08 (citing a case of an individual self-accommodating).
168

/d.

169

See generally KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004).
170
See Claudia M. Santosa eta!., Enhanced Creativity in Bipolar Disorder Patients: A Controlled
Study, !00 J. AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 31 (2007) (empirically finding enhanced creativity in bipolar disorder patients); Diana I. Simeonova eta!., Creativity in Familial Bipolar Disorder, 39 J. PSYCHIATRIC
REs. 623 (2005) (finding that children with bipolar disorder have enhanced creativity).
171
For a delightful literary treatment of why "madness" defines humanity, see SEBASTIAN FAULKS,
HUMAN TRACES (2005).
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to a position due to the effect of their disability, for instance, an unusual degree of creativity, high level of accuracy, or attention to detail. 172 Also accruing to the employer's benefit is the fact that many workers with
disabilities have higher job retention and equal or higher performance ratings on the job than do people without disabilities. 173
An additional externality accruing to employers of persons with mental
disabilities is that members of the organization can feel that they are acting
in a socially responsible manner and raising awareness of diverse individuals within their organization. Through interaction, managers may also
come to feel that they are better able to learn the needs of their staff and to
communicate better with the general workforce. They may also find that
including people with psycho-social disabilities leads to greater facility in
providing an overall more flexible and accommodating environment. 174
Potential workplace modifications can include altering schedules and
allowing absences, 175 modifying supervision arrangements, reorganizing duties, 176 and, rather than making a hiring decision on potential employees
with mental disabilities in an uncomfortable setting, permitting a probationary period for these employees. 177 When feasible, these steps lead to more
productive, satisfied, and safer workplaces for all workers and can increase
overall economic productivity and development. 178 In the larger disability
context, employers that have made accommodations report that doing so
has benefited their respective companies, including their workers without
disabilities. 179 In the modem workplace, more flexibility on these scheduling issues is becoming more prevalent with increased telecommuting.

172 For a personal account, see DANIEL TAMMET, BORN ON A BLUE DAY: INSIDE THE
EXTRAORDINARY MIND OF AN AUTISTIC SAVANT 148 (2007).
173
See Hunt & Hunt, supra note 117, at 267.
174
This, in essence, is the point that Susan Sturm makes more globally. See Sturm, supra note 120.
175
See OTA REPORT, supra note 109, at 75.
176
See Cook & Razzano, supra note II 0, at I07-{)8.
177 See TAMMET, supra note 172, at 927.
178
/d.; see a/so NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: CHALLENGES, BEST PRACTICES, AND NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUCCESS 28, 36 (2007)
(noting that diverse stakeholders observed that a more flexible workplace brings people with disabilities
to the center of the discussion in which the workplace needs of all employees are taken into account).
179
See NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, THE IMPACT OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:
ASSESSING THE PROGRESS TOWARD ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF THE ADA 96-97 (2007) ("Almost all
employers reported that providing the accommodations benefited the company by allowing it to retain
and/or promote a qualified employee. Other direct benefits reported included eliminating the cost of
training a new employee, saving on worker's compensation or insurance costs, increasing the accommodated worker's productivity, improving the accommodated worker's attendance, and increasing the diversity of the company."). Employers also reported that making accommodations gave them an
opportunity to display their commitment to their employees, which was something that all employees
valued. /d. at 99.
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In addition to more readily calculable benefits, Peter Blanck also describes "ripple effects" emanating from the provision of accommodations. 180
Among these desirable consequences are purported higher productivity, 181
greater dedication, 182 and better identification of qualified candidates for
promotion. 183 Employers may also enjoy fewer insurance claims, reduced
post-injury rehabilitation costs, 184 an improved corporate culture, 185 and
more widespread use by workers without disabilities of efficiencyenhancing technologies previously utilized exclusively by their peers with
disabilities. 186
CONCLUSION

Mark Weber has produced a worthy contribution to the antidiscrimination literature by highlighting the pervasive existence of disability-based
harassment, describing the ways such prejudice affects its targets, and arguing that current disability law provides tools to combat that harassment.
Throughout Disability Harassment, Weber explains and documents the socially created stigma induced by the disability classification, one manifestation of which is disability harassment. Building on this point, this Review
Essay examines the impact of unconscious and nonintentional discrimination against biologically atypical workers. It then argues that as a normative matter, the American workplace should incorporate individuals with
psycho-social disabilities, a group widely considered to be among the most
socially marginalized. To support that assertion, the Review Essay demonstrates the social and economic benefits to society, and to the workplace, of
pursuing mentally disabled occupational integration.
Weber's book helps demonstrate that people with disabilities should be
an integral part of society as opposed to being members of a discrete
"other" category. In the same vein, we note that incorporating mentally
180

See PETER DAVID BLANCK, COMMUNICATING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT,
TRANSCENDING COMPLIANCE: 1996 FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO. 26-27 (1996).
181
Patricia M. Owens, Editorial, Manager's Journal: Employee Disabilities Needn't Impair Profits,
WALL ST. J., June 7, 1999, at A22 ("Savvy employers have figured out that a can-do attitude for employees with impairments is good for profits and productivity.").
182
See, e.g., Stuart Silverstein, On the Job: With Help from New Technology, More Disabled Join
the Work Force, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1998, at C5 ("What you find are employees who probably are
more focused and more dedicated to doing quality work." (quoting EarthLink's vice president)).
183
See Thomas W. Hale et al., Persons with Disabilities: Labor Market Activity, /994, MONTHLY
LAB. REv., Sept. 1998, at 3, 3 (relating that the disabled are less likely to work in high paying positions
relative to the nondisabled).
184
See BLANCK, supra note 180, at 26-27.
185
See id. at 8 ("[W]hen Sears hires, works with, and accommodates qualified employees with disabilities, Sears enhances its ... employee morale." (quoting Chairman and CEO of Sears)).
186
For instance, the nonvisually impaired employees of a large insurance company assimilated
voice-recognition technology originally provided as an accommodation. See Berven & Blanck, supra
note 164, at 85-89 (discussing faults of cost-benefit paradigms in determining whether employers suffer
undue hardship and explaining the "ripple effect").
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disabled individuals should be viewed as part and parcel of the larger social
enterprise of increasing flexibility in the evolving workplace, rather than as
an isolated program of social justice. The combined effects of technology
and globalization increasingly impact the way businesses conduct their affairs. Whereas twenty years ago computers were rare, telecommuting unheard of, and "outsourcing" unrealistic, these modalities have become
standard.
Employers have responded by becoming increasingly diverse in their
hiring and flexible in the ways that they conduct business. Despite the employment at will doctrine, companies are increasingly concerned with retaining their talented employees. By integrating workers with psychosocial disabilities-presently among the most excluded from the workforce-employers can learn lessons that will enable them to keep better
hold of traditionally excluded groups, including racial minorities and
women. 187 Thus, by embracing the most marginalized, employers may also
reap benefits amongst other employees.

187 See generally RliTH O'BRIEN, BODIES IN REVOLT: GENDER, DISABILITY, AND A WORKPLACE
ETHIC OF CARE (2005) (advocating for a general workplace ethic of care modeled after the ADA).
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